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Hazardous waste continuously infiltrates and pollutes all walks
of everyday life including land.' This widespread pollution has re-
cently resulted in some 1500 sites being designated by the federal
government for cleanup. 2 The legislative intervention, however, is
not cheap; the cleanup costs could well eclipse sixteen billion dol-
lars by 2009.3 In light of these high figures, property owners who
exhibit the voluntary initiative to clean their own land before haz-
ardous waste accumulates deserve praise. Yet, the reality is that far
more landowners wait for the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to be triggered
first by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).4
CERCLA's impact in land contamination cases is twofold: (1)
EPA may step in and clean the site and then bring an administrative
action against the owners for the costs incurred; or (2) order the
landowner to clean the site at his own expense in a cost recovery
action. 5 Either remedy permits a landowner's action for contribu-
tion against other parties responsible for that contamination.
6
1. SeeJ. Richard Shotts, Morris Enterprises v. McShares, 1NC: Innocent PRPs and
Section 107 Claims in the Tenth Circuit, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 491, 491 (2004) (citing
that waste pollutes land, air and water in alarming quantities).
2. See id. at 491 (noting that widespread federal intervention has led to in-
crease in cumulative costs of these tasks).
3. See id. (stating that more than 380 sites are being cleaned under supervi-
sion of Environmental Protection Agency). The most notorious example of such
contamination is Love Canal, New York, where 21,800 gallons of chemical waste
were dumped over an eleven year span beginning in 1942 which led to citizen
evacuation and the demolition of 300 homes; the disaster stirred the adoption of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980. See id.
4. See BrentJ. Horton, CERCLA 's Contribution Provision: Must a PRP First Face
an Administrative Order or Cost Recovery Action? A Proposal for Amendment, 53 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 209, 209 (2003) (stating that landowner diligence in voluntary cleanup
cases is rare since most wait for EPA to bring action under CERCLA).
5. See id. (citing pertinent sections of CERCLA and their functions to facilitate
cleanup). Section 107 of CERCLA, the cost recovery action, allows for EPA's inter-
vention in site cleanup. Id. at 212. Section 106 allows the president to issue an
order forcing parties to remedy a contamination that threatens the environment.
Id. For a detailed discussion of EPA's remedy against landowners and the relevant
operating provisions of CERCLA, see infra notes 27-65 and accompanying text.
6. See 42 U.S.C § 9613(f) (1) (1994) (stating terms of contribution).
(261)
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Yet, a conflict emerges if the original landowner acts out of this
expected framework and attempts the aforementioned voluntary
cleanup without a federal mandate. The current conflict in land
contamination cases considers whether that party can bring a con-
tribution action if the cleanup preceded a CERCLA action.7 The
core of any current debate regarding CERCLA's contribution provi-
sion mirrors a familiar scenario: Landowner A pollutes a property
and sells to Party B; B continues to pollute and then voluntarily
hires Party C to cleanup the waste; B is left with a million dollar bill
and now wants contribution from A under CERCLA.8
The answer to the scenario varies and presents a dilemma for a
wide mass of plaintiffs: Do parties attempt to voluntarily promote
prompt and effective cleanups of hazardous waste sites or simply
wait until CERCLA is triggered and then sue to have a stronger con-
tribution claim?9
Section II of this Note discusses the facts of the seminal case
involving this issue addressed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc.,10 where the court held
that a party may commence an action for contribution regardless of
a prior pending or decided CERCLA action."1 Section III discusses
the historical background behind CERCLA's relevant cleanup pro-
visions, including its legislative purpose and judicial conflicts. 12
Section IV discusses the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals majority
holding in Aviall and notes the dissent's interpretation in siding
with the district court's ruling. 13 Section V highlights the court's
choice to side with Plaintiff Aviall and discusses how the court
should have effectuated the dissent's and Cooper Industries' argu-
ment.14 Finally, Section VI analyzes the potential impact of the
7. See Horton, supra note 4, at 210-11 (considering conflict involving voluntary
cleanup procedures and contribution claims).
8. See id. at 210 (establishing common scenario by which voluntary cleanups
become problematic and questioning whether plaintiff can recover).
9. See id. (posing current landowners' dilemma facing cleanup costs). Many
courts have barred these actions, holding that a CERCLA action is a prerequisite
while others have allowed such suits to go forward without a pending or resolved
CERCLA action. Id. For a discussion of the circuit split on the contribution issue,
see infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
10. See 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002) (deciding issue of whether CERCLA ac-
tion is prerequisite to contribution under § 113(f) (1)).
11. For a discussion of the Aviall holding, see infra notes 16-26 and accompa-
nying text.
12. For a discussion of CERCLA, see infra notes 27-65 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the court's rationale, see infra notes 66-98.
14. For a discussion of these arguments, see infra notes 99-144 and accompa-
nying text.
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court's holding on contribution disputes among parties involved in
land contamination cases. 15
II. FACTS
A. The Model Case: Aviall
The most recent case addressing this current controversy
behind CERCLA's contribution provision is AvialL.1 6 Aviall Ser-
vices, Inc. (Aviall) purchased property from Cooper Industries
(Cooper) in 1981.17 During its ownership and until the sale to Avi-
all, Cooper allowed numerous hazardous substances to contami-
nate its facility.18 Upon the purchase of the property, Aviall
continued the pollution for three more years but later learned of
the contamination and notified the appropriate state authorities. 19
After prodding from the state, Aviall commenced a nearly decade
long cleanup costing millions of dollars. 20 The cleanup was totally
voluntary as EPA never classified the property as contaminated and
did not take any role in the cleanup. 21 After completing the
lengthy project, Aviall contacted Cooper seeking reimbursement
for its costs but Cooper refused. 22 Aviall subsequently sued Cooper
15. For a discussion of the policy issues linked to the Aviall decision, see infra
notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
16. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 679 (reviewing District Court's dismissal of case with-
out prejudice).
17. See Horton, supra note 4, at 214 (noting details of transaction between
parties).
18. See id. at 216 (noting company's share of pollution). Cooper Industries
Inc. ran four aircraft maintenance facilities that rebuilt aircraft engines in Texas
during the years the pollution occurred. Id. at 215. The hazardous substances at
issue, which included petroleum, contaminated the neighboring grounds and
groundwater up until the year of the sale to Aviall. Id. Aviall eventually sold all
four sites to other parties during the 1990's but retained responsibility for the
cleanup that was necessary. See Brief for Cooper Indus. at 3-4, Aviall Ser., Inc. v.
Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1192).
19. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 677 (describing that Aviall sent notice to Texas Nat-
ural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC)). The TNRCC initially sent a
letter to Aviall containing a list of required remediation activities. Id. at 679. Later
letters alleged violations of state statutory regulations and included a promise of an
"enforcement action" if the company failed to follow through on a previously
stated remediation option. Id.
20. SeeJoshua P. Fershee, Aviall Services v. Cooper Industries: The Fifth Circuit
Makes Securing CERCLA Contribution for Environnntal Cleanup A Messy Proposition, 76
TUL. L. REv. 1749, 1751 (2002) (referring to lengthy time and costs of Aviall's
undertaking).
21. See Horton, supra note 4, at 216 (emphasizing that EPA never contacted
Aviall or Cooper, never took remedial action or issued administrative order de-
manding cleanup).
22. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Aviall Serv., Inc. v.
Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d at 677 (5th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1192) (outlining that
2005] 263
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in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas seeking con-
tribution under CERCLA section 113(f) (1) which allows potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) of contamination to seek contribution
from other PRPs for cleanup costs. 23
Cooper contended that because Aviall had not yet been sub-
jected to a civil action under a CERCLA, it was precluded from a
valid contribution claim; the district court agreed with this argu-
ment in its dismissal of the claim.24 The court found a right of
contribution only where a PRP has completed or is in a pending
CERCLA civil action and that the provision did not allow contribu-
tion without these prerequisites. 25 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit dis-
agreed and reversed, holding that a PRP seeking a section 113
contribution suit is not required to have an ongoing or adjudged
action against it in order to recover its costs. 26
III. BACKGROUND
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 in response to the environ-
mental dangers posed by contaminated property.27 Despite Con-
gress' best intentions in the statute's enactment, it remains
ambiguous and tremendously litigated. 28 Nonetheless, CERCLA's
CERCLA contribution claim provide sole basis for federal jurisdiction). Further,
Aviall alleged a breach of contractual and warranty obligations under an asset
purchase agreement and claimed that Cooper was liable under Texas law. Id.
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1). For terms of the statute, see infra note 51 and
accompanying text.
24. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 679 (stressing that PRP seeking contribution from
other PRPs must have pending or adjudged § 106 or § 107(a) action against it).
The majority looked foremost at CERCLA's text to state that a plain reading of
§ 113(f)(1) required a party seeking contribution to have filed a claim during or
following a CERCLA claim against it. See Fershee, supra note 20, at 1753. This was
followed by a reference to BLACK's LAW DIrTIONARY which found that the common
definition of contribution requires a tortfeasor to first face judgment before it can
seek contribution from other parties. Id.
25. See Fershee, supra note 20, at 1754 (citing lower court's ruling). Further,
the majority cited various district court decisions that supported their decision. Id.
By contrast, the dissent at the district court level undermined this contention by
stating that some of the legislative history relied upon addressed CERCLA provi-
sions never adopted into law. Id. at 1756. Further, the dissent argued that the
majority's reliance on a "hodgepodge of other district court cases" was unfounded
since none addressed the point at issue. Id. at 1754.
26. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 690 (stating decision in favor of Aviall disfavoring
prior CERCLA action). For a discussion of the majority's rationale in its reversal,
see infra notes 66-89 and accompanying text.
27. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998) (stating that CER-
CLA responds to serious environmental and health dangers posed by property
contaminated by hazardous substances).
28. See Shotts, supra note 1, at 492 (noting that statutory text has caused much
litigation and confusion as to provision's precise understanding). Courts fre-
4
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol16/iss2/5
2005] CERCLA's CONTRIBUTION PROVISION 265
goals in the realm of environmental law are necessary to provide for
the rapid cleanup of hazardous waste contamination and to force
polluters to pay for cleanup costs of removing that waste. 29 Under
CERCLA, PRPs cover a broad range of entities which permits the
statute to extend liability to as many people as possible involved in
the generation of waste. 30 To facilitate the cleanup goals, CERCLA
operates under three primary schemes: a section 106 administra-
tive order, a section 107 cost recovery action and a section
113(f)(1) contribution action.3 1
A. CERCLA Liability Scheme
1. Section 106
CERCLA section 106 essentially allows the President to issue an
order forcing PRPs to provide a remedy for contamination that has
been released or potentially could be released in the environ-
ment.32 The section states in part that if the President determines
that there may be a substantial endangerment to the public health
or welfare of the environment, " [h] e may require the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States to secure such relief as may be necessary to
abate such danger."33 This language authorizes EPA to compel, by
means of an administrative order or a request forjudicial relief, the
quently struggle to interpret CERCLA's less-than-straightforward language which
has led to differing conclusions about when PRPs may sue other PRPs. Id.
29. See id. (citing focus of CERCLA in environmental cases). The legislative
history confirms that CERCLA has two goals: (1) to provide for swift cleanup of
hazardous waste and contamination; and (2) to hold responsible parties liable for
the costs of these cleanups. Id.
30. See Horton, supra note 4, at 212 (noting these PRPs include current owner
of facility, owner of facility at time hazardous substance was disposed of at facility
and any person who transported hazardous substance to facility). The provision's
broad reach extends from those who create waste through those who dispose of it.
Id.
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1994) (describing administrative order); 42
U.S.C. § 960 7 (a) (1994) (outlining cost recovery provision); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1)
(describing terms of CERCLA contribution scheme). For a further discussion of
the general functions of these provisions, see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying
text.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (presenting terms of statute's applicability). Yet,
the reality is that most of this power has been delegated to EPA which can success-
fully operate § 106(a). See Dico v. Diamond, 35 F.3d 348, 349 (8th Cir. 1994) (stat-
ing that while CERCLA originally granted authority to President, he has delegated
it to EPA).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (outlining President's role in action). The provi-
sion also allows the President, after notice to the affected State, to take other ac-
tion necessary to protect the public health and welfare of the environment. Id.
5
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responsible parties to undertake response actions which the govern-
ment then monitors.3 4
2. Section 107
CERCLA section 107, known as the cost recovery provision,
allows specified parties to clean toxic sites and then sue for the cost
of cleanup against other parties.35 The provision authorizes the
United States or other entities to seek the recovery of cleanup costs
from four categories of PRPs which commonly include "owners and
operators of facilities at which hazardous substances are located." 36
The section states, in relevant part, that PRPs are liable for all costs
of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a state and any other necessary costs of response
incurred by any other person consistent with the national contin-
gency plan. 37 The majority of courts have ruled that persons who
are not themselves liable may clean up contaminated property and
then invoke this provision to seek reimbursement from other PRPs,
but a party who falls within one of the four categories cannot rely
on section 107(a) to seek full recovery from another jointly liable
party. 38
34. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 3 (ex-
plaining facts and procedural steps of CERCLA's various contribution provision
after 1986 amendments).
35. See Shotts, supra note 1, at 491 (emphasizing that any party bringing such
a claim must prove that: (1) the site classifies as a facility; (2) the defendant is a
PRP; (3) a release or threatened release has occurred; and (4) the release or
threatened release has caused the plaintiff to incur response costs). Id. at 495.
The defenses to a 107(a) claim are limited to an act of God, an act of war or "an
act or omission of a third party other than an employer or agent of the defendant."
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (detailing 4 classes of persons covered). There are
three other classes of PRPs, including the owner and operator of a facility and
anyone who accepts any hazardous substances for transport to treatment facilities
from which there is either an actual release or potential release which then causes
the incurrence of response costs of a hazardous substance. Id.
37. See id. § 9607(a) (4) (underscoring PRP liability situations).
38. See Horton, supra note 4, at 217-18 (noting that courts effectually created
circuit split in their attempt to reconcile § 107). A minority of federal district
courts allow plaintiffs who themselves are PRPs to sue other responsible parties
under 107. See Shotts, supra note 1, at 492 (emphasizing that most federal circuits
have barred plaintiff PRPs from pursuing 107 because 113 actions allow for pro
rate recovery from other PRPs). Plaintiff PRPs prefer a 107(a) cost recovery claim
as the provision allows strictjoint and several liability over defendant PRPs and has
a longer statute of limitations. Id. at 498.
6
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B. The Beginning of CERCLA's Contribution Scheme
CERCLA originally remained silent as to a right of contribu-
tion.39 The first cases allowing such a remedy evolved through fed-
eral common law, most notably in City of Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chemical Co.40 In that case, the city of Philadelphia sued another
PRP for cleanup costs from illegal dumping in a city landfill though
neither the federal nor state governments had brought a suit under
CERCLA.41 The district court rejected the defendant's argument
that as the city was subject to liability under the statute, it could not
recover cleanup costs and concluded that Philadelphia's right to
maintain the action was not barred. 42 Subsequent cases with simi-
lar facts agreed with the court's holding.43 The Supreme Court in
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States44 expressly acknowledged this devel-
opment of the federal common law when it held that section 107
"impliedly authorizes" a contribution cause of action.45
In Sun Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., (Sun Co.),46 the court
addressed the statute of limitation period in voluntary cleanup
cases and the contribution claims that emerge from them.47 The
plaintiff, who had waited five years to sue, had not incurred costs
39. See Aviall Serv. Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 2002)
(stating that as enacted, CERCLA contained no explicit provision allowing recov-
ery via contribution). For a discussion of the evolution of CERCLA's contribution
provision, see infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
40. See 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that city was not
precluded from maintaining action under CERCLA).
41. See id. at 1139 (noting that there was no indication that city had been sued
or been object of CERCLA administrative cleanup order). The city sought to re-
cover all cleanup costs and consequential damages which resulted from the illegal
dumping, claiming that they were owed recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (4) (B)
for their "necessary costs of response." Id. at 1141.
42. See id. at 1143 (noting that city's action was valid under CERCLA).
43. See Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913, 916 (N.D.
Okla. 1987) (concluding that even responsible party under CERCLA, who volunta-
rily pays CERCLA response costs, may bring action in its own behalf to collect
cleanup costs against parties allegedly responsible for production of waste).
44. See generally 511 U.S. 809 (1994) (deciding implications of remedies under
§ 107).
45. See Aviall Serv., Inc. v. Cooperlndus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 683 (5th Cir. 2002)
(citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994)). In Key Tronic,
which was decided after § 113(f) (1)'s enactment, the court considered § 113 and
§ 107 as overlapping remedies, the former express and the latter implied. See Key
Tronic, 511 U.S. at 809.
46. See 124 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting need for clarification regard-
ing relationship between §§ 107 and 113).
47. See id. at 1189. The facts at issue involved an abandoned limestone quarry
in Oklahoma that operated as a landfill from 1972 to 1976. Id. During the period,
hazardous material were brought to the site and seeped into the soil and ground
water. Id. EPA identified plaintiffs as well as other parties as PRPs who had con-
tributed to the waste of the site leading to the action. Id.
20051
7
Sabnis: Aviall v. Cooper Industries: The Emerging Controversy Behind CERC
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
268 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. XVI: p. 261
pursuant to a civil action under section 106 or 107 and claimed that
his three year statute of limitations in which to bring a contribution
suit had not run.48 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that PRPs who incur cleanup costs pursuant to a voluntary ac-
tion must bring a claim for contribution within six years and not
the standard three year statutory limit that usually triggers after a
formal administrative order.49
C. The Passage of Section 113 Contribution Action
Congress passed section 113(f) against this judicial backdrop. 50
The CERCLA section 113 contribution provision, which Congress
added as part of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA), explicitly addressed when a PRP may seek con-
tribution and reads in part:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable under section 107(a),
during or following any civil action under section 106 or
under section 107(a). Nothing in this subsection shall di-
minish the right of any person to bring an action for con-
tribution in the absence of a civil action under section 106
or section 107.51
Congress hoped to give all PRPs the right to sue for contribution
and to codify the judicially created right in prior years' caselaw.5 2
Further, the amendment promoted equitable solutions for appor-
tioning waste site cleanup costs by holding appropriate parties to
joint and several liability. 53 The SARA amendments further allow a
federal right of contribution for those who have contributed mini-
48. See id. (noting that district court held that plaintiffs action was not gov-
erned by triggering events of limitation period because Congress had created
omission in statute as it pertained to plaintiff's case).
49. See id. at 1192 (holding that six year statute of limitations applied to con-
tribution claims of PRPs that incur cleanup costs in other ways such as unilateral
EPA orders). For the text of the statute outlining the statute of limitations for
CERCLA contribution suits, see infra note 97.
50. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 683 (noting that Supreme Court had cast doubt on
availability of contribution and § 113 created machinery to create actions for
contribution).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). See also Horton, supra note 4, at 215. Congress
had a variety of agendas in passing the amendments: to encourage cost sharing
among PRPs, to rectify the lower courts' mistake of implementing contribution
rights that did not depend on pre-existing EPA administrative orders and to
strengthen actions for contribution. See Avial, 312 F.3d at 683.
52. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 684 (restating aims of CERCLA provisions).
53. See id. (noting that liability under CERCLA is strict and even joint and
several in some cases) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. I, at 74 (1985)).
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mally to the contamination provided they agree to an approved set-
tlement with the federal or state environmental enforcement
authority.5 4
D. CERCLA's Contribution Controversy
The CERCLA provisions have not been entirely flawless and
have led to judicial interpretation problems, most notably with the
cost recovery split tied to Congress' failure to delineate the relation-
ship between sections 107(a) and 113(f). 55 Though the cost recov-
ery split was eventually resolved, Aviall underscored a new emerging
controversy in CERCLA: must a PRP first face an administrative
order or cost recovery action before invoking 113(f) (1)?56 This
new contribution split opposes the opening language of section
113(f) (1) (the enabling clause) against the final sentence (the sav-
ings clause).57 The question is whether the opening language de-
noting "during or following" a civil action is affected by the
conclusion of the section that states the right of contribution is not
undermined in the absence of a civil action.58
Various circuit courts have added to the confusion. 59 In
Rumpke of Indiana v. Cummins Engine Co., 60 the Seventh Circuit
stated that it appeared that the statue required a 106 or 107(a) ac-
tion be underway or completed in order to seek contribution under
54. See Brief for Cooper Indus., supra note 18, at 12 (citing scope of contribu-
tion provision). Contribution from § 113(f) (3) (B) can be sought only from other
PRPs who have not settled their response costs with respect to the same site. Id.
55. See Robert P. Redemann and Michael F. Smith, The Evolution of PRP Stand-
ing Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liablity Act of
1980, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 300, 307 (2004) (noting that inter-
play between these two provisions has caused problems of courts confronting
whether PRP has standing to pursue cost recovery action). This controversy has
been termed the "cost recovery split." Id.
56. See Horton, supra note 4, at 222 (examining current controversy under
CERCLA contribution that led to Aviall).
57. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 687 (adding that one point of contention concerns
inter-relationship of first and last sentences of § 113(f)(1)).
58. See id. (citing that district court majority believed that interpreting savings
clause to allow contribution suits in the absence of CERCLA actions would render
enabling clause superfluous). For a discussion of the Court of Appeals decision
countering this viewpoint, see infra notes 66-89 and accompanying text. For the
pertinent text of § 113(f) (1), see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
59. See Fershee, supra note 20, at 1750 (establishing that broad framework has
been established for contribution splits due to several circuit holdings).
60. See 107 F.3d 1235, 1241 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting § 106 or 107(a) require-
ments when seeking contribution under 113(f) (1)).
2005]
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113(f) (1).61 In Ohm Remediation Services v. Evan Cooperage Co.,62 the
Fifth Circuit held that a party must be at least potentially liable
under CERCLA before seeking contribution, and the court there
found the contribution action appropriate because the defendant
in the case was in a pending CERC[A action.63 The Fourth Circuit
has stated that a PRP can seek contribution if it can show that it has
incurred response costs. 64 In that jurisdiction, parties have contin-
ued to bring 113(f) (1) suits despite the absence of a pending sec-
tion 106 or 107 action. 65
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the district court and ruled in favor of Aviall. 6 6 Judge Edith H.
Jones, writing for the majority, began her evaluation with a focus on
the plain language of the provision. 67 While acknowledging that
reasonable minds can conflict over the interpretation of section
113(f) (1), Judge Jones adopted what Aviall had argued as the most
reasonable interperation of the provision: a broader interpretation
of the "during or following" language of section 113(f) (1) was ap-
61. See Fershee, supra note 20, at 1750-51 (noting court's recognition that its
holding could provide disincentive for voluntary cleanups).
62. See 116 F.3d 1574, 1575 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing party liability and con-
tribution action).
63. See Fershee, supra note 20, at 1751 (stating prerequisites for valid contri-
bution action).
64. See id. (noting that courts do not examine whether PRP instituted cleanup
which another entity then supervised).
65. See id. (noting that § 113(f) (1) suits have been brought without 106 or 107
action). Earlier Fifth Circuit cases have also addressed this identical issue. See
Amoco Oil Co v. Borden, Inc, 889 F.2d 672, 673 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that
plaintiff who incurred response costs met § 113(f) (1) if liability was shown under
state or federal standards regarding release of hazardous waste). Federal district
courts have added to the conflict: some have declared a pending CERCLA claim
mandatory, others have found such a claim unnecessary and a contrary view has
allowed recovery if the parties were PRPs, regardless of other pending or adjudi-
cated CERCLA actions. See Fershee, supra note 20, at 1752. When Aviall was de-
cided by the lower court, the court stated there was no binding case law and
treated the issue as a case of first impression. Id.
66. See AviallServ., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 678 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding 10-3 majority decision contrary to district court panel majority whose
opinion generated en banc proceeding).
67. See id. (establishing that "plain" does not always equate to "indisputable;"
rather, such statutory construction draws strength from enactment's history and
legislation's general policies) (citing Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158
(1990)).
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propriate. 68 The court found that Cooper's argument limited sec-
tion 113(f) (1) and thereby distorted the interplay of the enabling
clause and the savings clause. 69 After proceeding with an analysis of
the background behind CERCLA and tracing the origin of section
113(f), the court returned to the statutory text to complete its
analysis.7 0
The court agreed that an expansive interpretation of section
113(f) (1) suited the text more since it facilitated PRP claims with-
out requiring pending or completed civil actions.7 1 The court
found crucial the use and omission of certain words in the relevant
section. 72 Because Congress used "may bring an action for contri-
bution" rather than the more limiting and narrow "only," it hinted
to the court that contribution actions were allowed in any circum-
stances.7 3 The court further adopted Aviall's contention that
requiring a prior civil suit is predicated on an erroneous under-
standing of the savings clause of section 113(f) (1).74 The court's
remedy was to give the savings clause a broad reading and consider
the enabling clause to be a statement of non-exclusive circum-
stances in which contribution actions applied.7 5
The majority dismissed any contrary reading to the relation-
ship of the enabling clause and the saving's clause of section
68. See id. at 681 (citing § 113(f)(1)). For the text of the statute, see supra
note 51 and accompanying text.
69. See Avia14 312 F.3d at 681 (noting that dissent's approach was unreasona-
ble in light of precedent and "other interpretive guideposts").
70. See id. (discussing court's use of statutory text in its analysis). The majority
reiterated that CERCLA was a method of controlling and financing governmental
and private cleanups of hazardous releases and that EPA's broad powers were a
means to require PRPs to reimburse the government. Id. The court made clear
that CERCLA's liability scheme makes the notion of contribution vital among all
PRPs so that those responsible for environmental damage to the site properly bear
costs. Id. at 681-82. For a discussion of the purposes behind CERCLA and the
history of the contribution provision, see supra notes 27-54 and accompanying text.
71. See Avialh 312 F.3d at 686 (arguing that language was intended for such
broad interpretation to benefit parties covered under statute).
72. See id. (arguing dissent's interpretation of language departs from plain
meaning).
73. See id. (concluding that word "only" is word choice of dissent, not Con-
gress, which characterized actions permissively). The majority reasoned that had
Congress desired, it may have used "only" multiple times to signify its intent to
narrow or exclude a provision. Id. Thus, Congress may have used "only" to limit
contribution actions after referenced CERCLA lawsuits, but took no action to do
so. See id.
74. See id. at 687 (emphasizing that this interpretation would be unnecessary
if the dissent had designated the appropriate broad scope to the last sentence of
§ 113(f) (1)).
75. See id. (arguing against dissent assertion that contribution action may be
brought before judgment is entered was not concession to majority's argument).
2005]
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113(f)(1).76 They noted that prior caselaw before the SARA
Amendment had failed to restrict contribution actions for parties
who had incurred disproportionate response costs. 77 The court
also believed that the savings clause furthered the statute's integ-
rity.78 Specifically, the savings statement confirmed that federal
courts were correct to enable PRPs to recover a proportionate share
of their costs against other PRPs. 79 Combined, the two clauses of
the provision properly effectuated parties' claims in complex haz-
ardous waste disputes and did not negate each other.80
Though Cooper relied heavily on judicial decisions that had
sided with their claim, the court found that many other appeals
courts that had ruled on CERCLA supported their non-restrictive
view and that any mention of a "cramped" reading of the provision
was usually isolated dicta without substance. 81 The majority relied
heavily on Sun Co. to address the statute of limitations issue that
voluntary cleanup cases involve. 82 The court, much like the major-
ity in Sun Co., rationalized that the statute potentially allows plain-
tiffs to have an expanded time in which to bring their contribution
claims though the plain language does not expressly authorize
this.83 The court consequently agreed with the six year statute of
76. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 687 (noting each sentence combines to provide
maximum latitude to parties rather than savings clause vitiating effects of enabling
clause).
77. See id. (noting that savings provision takes on new light in terms of this
fact). Pre-SARA caselaw did not restrict common law contribution actions until
during or after proceedings or civil actions against the party who had incurred
disproportionate remediation and response costs. Id.
78. See id. (claiming this was not situation in which text of savings clause robs
first sentence of § 113(f) (1) of its meaning).
79. See id. (noting that savings provision reinforced that federal courts were
correct to allow PRPs to recover and that this eliminated uncertainty in case law
prior to 1986 amendments regarding availability of contribution under CERCLA).
80. See id. (concluding that first and last sentence of section combine to af-
ford maximum latitude in such cases).
81. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 688 (arguing that given monetary exposure and
volume of litigation surrounding CERCLA mandates, one must assume that law-
yers have had sufficient incentive and opportunity to explore statutory meaning).
82. See id. at 689 (addressing Tenth Circuit's reasoning behind broad inter-
pretation).
83. See id. (emphasizing PRPs who voluntarily incur cleanup costs potentially
have unlimited time in which to bring their contribution claims)(citing Sun Co.,
Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Inc., 124 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1997)). The court also cited
that this authority permitted PRPs which had incurred costs in some other way
other than a suit to classify as a covered party under § 113(f). Id. The court
agreed that prior cases had done nothing to wreak havoc with the framework es-
tablished in 113(g) governing the CERCLA limitations period. Id.
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limitation construct in voluntary cleanup cases in which to bring a
contribution claim.84
In its conclusion, the court considered supporting policy con-
siderations.8 5 The narrower view of section 113(f) (1) had adverse
consequences in light of CERCLA's aforementioned stated pur-
poses: the slowing of reallocation costs to more culpable PRPs, the
discouraging of voluntary expenditures of PRP funds on cleanups,
and the diminishing of incentives for responsible parties to volunta-
rily report contamination.8 6 The court was particularly troubled by
the dissent's notion that the savings clause exclusively enabled an
action for contribution under state law because state laws dealing
with contribution varied greatly and potentially were pre-empted by
CERCLA.8 7 Though acknowledging that these considerations did
not change Congress' language, the court realized that such an
overview behind the policy could aid in an understanding of the
statute.88 Thus, based on the apparent understanding of the lan-
guage and its function in section 113(f)(1) and other key policy
and precedent, the court held that a prior section 106 or 107 action
was not required for a contribution suit.8 9
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Emilio M. Garza established his argument against the
majority by citing the term "may" found in the contribution
clause.90 For the dissent, the word created an exclusive cause of
action and 113(f) (1) thus could not operate outside the function of
a civil action.91 Further, the dissent emphasized that the phrase
"during or following" served the purpose of setting a limitation that
84. See id. (agreeing that six year statute of limitations construct was consistent
with policy).
85. See id. at 689-90 (stating that dissent's view would create obstacles to
achieving CERCLA's purposes).
86. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 690 (claiming dissent's limiting position operates to
contravene goals and focus that CERCLA aims to facilitate and are unnecessary in
light of faithful reading of § 113).
87. See id. (noting state law is inferior and questionable remedy for Congress
to have embraced). The majority found problematic that not all states allow contri-
butions before the party seeking contribution has been subjected to judgment and
from those that do, the substantive and procedural rules greatly varied. See id.
88. See id. at 691 (proposing since policy considerations add to understanding
of language, stronger understanding would better fulfill statutory purpose).
89. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (outlining reasons for over-
turning district court).
90. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 691 (Garza, J., dissenting) (noting statute's plain
language).
91. See id. at 692 (Garza, J., dissenting) (stating the word "may" in enabling
provision generally establishes exclusive cause of action) (citing Resolution Trust
2005]
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requires an initial cost recovery action prior to any claim for contri-
bution.92 In its support, the dissent found that to have the savings
clause override the enabling clause would negate the elementary
canon of statutory construction which aims to avoid weakening an
enacting sentence. 93 In response to the court's reliance on the sav-
ings clause, the dissent subsequently argued that the sentence ex-
emplified Congress' attempt to preserve state law causes of action
since the omission of the word "civil action" aimed to relegate pro-
ceedings in a non-federal forum. 94
In closing, the dissent emphasized that the comprehensive
structure of section 113 supported their interpretation.95 Section
l13(g) (3) sets forth a three year statute of limitations for a poten-
tial contribution action which begins to run only following a sec-
tion 106 or 107 action.96 The majority interpretation required the
courts to derive the limitations period to apply in a certain class of
cases, an effort the dissent deemed unnecessary. 97 These facts
supported Cooper's argument that the language and statutory
structure of CERCIA's contribution provision, regardless of the
majority's emphasis on countervailing public policy and case prece-
Corp v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1361 (5th Cir. 1994)). Further, the dissent cited
WEBSTER'S DICrIoNARY as defining "may" as "must" or "shall." Id.
92. See id. (Garza, J., dissenting) (explaining that § 113(f)(1) requires cost
recovery action before contribution triggers). The dissent noted that the phrase
served the dual purposes to reflect that contribution actions do not require the
execution of a final judgment before they can be brought and that an initial cost
recovery action commence before a claim for contribution. Id.
93. See id. at 693 (Garza, J., dissenting) (noting enacting sentence with limit-
ing language cannot be trumped by savings clause).
94. See id. at 693 n.34 (Garza, J. dissenting) (stating that if § 113(f)(1) uses
the term "civil action," it is referring to action brought in federal court while sav-
ings clause only references "action"). According to the dissent's reasoning, § 113
permits contribution actions following an administrative order only when the gov-
ernment files suit in federal court; this is further supported by the section's addi-
tional reference to the FEDERAL RULES OF CML PROCEDURE. Id.
95. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 694 (Garza, J., dissenting) (referring to framework
of provision).
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 9 6 13 (g) (3) (outlining when period begins to run).
97. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 695 (Garza, J., dissenting) (criticizing such attempts
by courts as "herculean," noting that § 113(g) (3) (A) provides clear statute of limi-
tation). § 113(g) (3) provides:
No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be
commenced more than 3 years after-
(A) the date ofjudgment in any action under this chapter for recovery of
such costs or damages, or
(B) the date of an administrative order under section 9622(g) of this title
(relation to de minimis settlements) or 9622(h) of this title (relating to
cost recovery settlements) or entry of a judicially approved settlement
with respect to such costs or damages.
42 U.S.C. § 9613 (g)(3).
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dent, supported that a pending or complete 106 or 107(a) action
must occur before a PRP may seek contribution under section
113(f)(1).98
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. The Majority's Nullification of Contribution
Though the majority gave an elaborate argument for its ruling
for Aviall, the decision rests on a shaky foundation typified by the
court's treatment of a fundamental term in the claim: contribu-
tion.99 The court permitted Aviall to seek recovery from Cooper
despite traditional understandings of contribution principles in tort
law.100 Consistent with the common notions of the term, section
106 and 107(a) allow contribution claims in an attempt to quantify
and resolve joint liability among multiple responsible parties. 101
The Fifth Circuit, however, ignored that typically "[a] right to con-
tribution is recognized when two or more persons are liable to the
same plaintiff for the same injury and one of the joint tortfeasors
has paid more than his fair share of the common liability."'10 2
Many scholars had, until recently, noted that contribution is
barred as long as the claim of an original plaintiff remains outstand-
ing and that a settlement or judgment resolving that claim must
exist. l03 Only recently has the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS changed the
definition to allow a person to sue for contribution both during the
98. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 696 (Garza, J., dissenting) (arguing that case law
provided no clear guidance on interpretation of contribution provision due to va-
rious courts' differing conclusions and that clear statutory language did not deem
it necessary to weigh policy considerations).
99. See Brief for Cooper Indus., supra note 18, at 26 (stating majority created
"free-standing" cause of action for parties like Aviall).
100. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 10
(arguing that term's basic tenets were violated).
101. See id. (emphasizing interplay between CERCLA's remedial provisions,
§ 106 and § 107 and basic tenets of contribution).
102. See id. (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451
U.S. 77, 87-88 (1981)). Scholars have noted that the notion of contribution cen-
ters on equity. See Nicholas Wallwork, Spreading the Cost of Environmental Cleanup:
Contribution Claims Under CERCLA and RCRA, SJ065 ALI-ABA 227 (2004). This
means that parties must share a common liability and each must be responsible for
its equitable share of that liability. Id. The means to determine this share vary
from the pro tanto approach (establishing each defendant's share by dividing the
total amount paid to the plaintiff by the number of defendants) or the compara-
tive fault approach which measures fault by holding each defendant responsible
for the amount of their own liability. Id.
103. See Wallwork, supra note 102, at 227(emphasizing that settlement or
judgment resolving claim as prerequisite for contribution). This understanding
was emphasized in the Restatements: "[a] person seeking contribution must extin-
guish the liability of a person against whom contribution is sought for the portion
20051 275
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pendency as well as after a judgment or settlement regarding liabil-
ity. 10 4 The essence of contribution under either definition is that
one who makes voluntary payments cannot seek reimbursement. 10 5
Thus, Aviall should not have been allowed to bring a section
113(f) (1) contribution action until facing a 106 administrative or-
der or a section 107 cost recovery action, each of which may have
legally established Aviall'sjoint underlying liability.10 6 As Aviall had
not faced or was not facing liability in the form of a pending CER-
CLA action and could not be classified as a "tortfeasor," its claims
should have been dismissed. 10 7 The Fifth Circuit mistakenly im-
planted into CERCLA a right of a PRP, neither adjudged liable nor
even facing liability, to seek contribution when a party who nor-
mally discharges liability voluntarily may not have such a claim.108
In doing so, the court ignored that it is best for Congress to alter
the law of contribution so dramatically as to fit CERCLA's contribu-
tion scheme. 109
B. Legislative Intent Sides with a Plain Reading
The Fifth Circuit further concluded that the first sentence of
section 113(f)(1) allows contribution actions in the absence of an
ongoing or completed section 106 or 107(a) action because Con-
of liability, either by settlement with the plaintiff or by satisfaction of judgment."
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 23 (2000).
104. See Brief for Cooper Indus., supra note 18, at 28 (citing principal of new
restatement).
105. See id. at 28 n.22 (establishing voluntary payoffs from party makes one
ineligible for contribution suit). Further, the equity rule provides that "contribu-
tion will not be allowed in favor of a volunteer." See id. at 29 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 886 cmt. e (1979).
106. See id. at 29 (explaining company was not deemed tortfeasor as judgment
of law undermining common law definition of contribution).
107. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 10
(outlining error in court's reasoning which empowered claim under § 113). Fur-
ther, Cooper argued with the dissent that the savings clause merely preserves any
independent right to contribution that exists apart from § 113(f)(1), such as the
state law Aviall invoked in its claim. Id. For a discussion of the majority reading of
the savings clause, see supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
108. See Brief for Cooper Indus., supra note 18, at 29 (arguing majority added
privilege not customary in law of contribution). Thus, removed from contribution
in the present case are notions of common liability and that the party seeking
contribution has been required to pay more than its fair share. Id. (citing Northwest
Airlines Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77 (1981)).
109. See id. (arguing for congressional intervention). If Congress had in-
tended to overhaul the traditional notions of federal contribution, it would have
done so explicitly and unambiguously; the Court of Appeals' holding works to
transform contribution by implication. Id.
16
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gress omitted the term "only."110 Yet, the court failed to discern
that Congress' intentions are clear from the plain language of the
statutory text that it did choose to include.11 The legislative inclu-
sion of "may" in an enabling provision leaves no strong interpreta-
tion that a PRP may sue before a pending CERCLA action since
the term prevents alternative causes of action. 112 Further, section
113(f) (1)'s language is clear and exact and follows the paradigm of
a permissive but limited license. 1 3 That is, the statute grants af-
firmative rights of contribution only under certain prerequisites (a
prior or pending section 106 and 107(a)) and not when a claimant
still desires to sue but has not met those requirements. 1 4 The "dur-
ing or following" language clearly outlines the narrow limitation of
the statute.' 1 5
The legislative history corroborates this interpretation and
strongly suggests that Congress intended to prevent such a liberal
right of contribution.' 16 The pertinent Senate and House bills that
ultimately became 113 (f) (1) contained different contribution pro-
visions, but each chamber targeted the goal of contribution only
after a section 106 or 107(a) suit or after a CERC[A based settle-
ment.' 1 7 When the Judiciary Committee amended a previous ver-
sion of section 113, the change was outlined as affecting only those
persons who settle with EPA and defendants in CERCLA actions
who seek contribution from other PRPs.118 The legislative history
110. See Aviall Serv., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 686 (5th Cir.
2002) (arguing for broader interpretation of statute). For a further discussion of
the court's plain language interpretation of the statute, see supra note 75 and ac-
companying text.
111. See id. at 691 (ignoring plain language of statute). For a further discus-
sion of the dissent's interpretation of CERCLA's contribution provision language,
see supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
112. See id. (indicating "may" forecloses other causes of action).
113. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 11 n.6
(equating provision to license with limited privileges). The dissent in Aviall ar-
gued CERCLA 113(0(1) granted affirmative rights but only to a very limited ex-
tent. See Avial4 312 F.3d at 691.
114. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 691 (explaining basics of permissive, but limited
license). The dissent argued that the provision's familiar syntax and grammar is
routinely employed in this sort of license. Id. A sign stating "Visitors May Enter
Through the Front Door During Normal Business Hours" affirmatively informs
that a visitor may enter through the front door only during proscribed periods and
may not simply enter any time the visitor wishes. Id.
115. See id. (outlining limitation created by "during or following" language).
116. See id. at 695 n.5 (referring to SARA's legislative history to support argu-
ment of limitation on contribution).
117. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 14
(relying on Senate and House bills as focusing on contribution).
118. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 695 n.12 (referring to judiciary report).
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does not mention that a contribution action may be brought in the
absence of a prior or pending CERLCA action nor does it advocate
such liberal suits.1 19 A subsequent House-Senate Conference Com-
mittee, which produced the final language of the bill, adopted this
precise "during or following" formulation. 120
The court also ignored that section 113(f)(1) relies on
107 (a)'s definition of liability and apportions cost among liable par-
ties. 121 Congress intended to create the contribution provision as a
mechanism for apportioning CERCLA-defined costs and to incor-
porate the liabilities established in 107.122 In other words, section
113 is a subset of section 107 which then must mean that a contri-
bution action should be contingent upon the commencement of a
prior or pending cost recovery action. 123
C. The Improper Nullification of State Law
The majority holding is further problematic in that it assumes
CERCLA's goals are not met outside of federal mandates. 124 Sec-
tion 113(f)(1)'s savings clause clearly creates and facilitates state
law causes of action rather than overriding the enabling clause. 125
When Congress has meant to preserve both federal and state law
causes of action, it has said so explicitly in other provisions of CER-
119. See id. (stating that legislative history of§ 113(f) (1) never stated that con-
tribution action can be brought in absence of prior or pending cost recovery
action.)
120. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 15.
The House bill initially provided that "[a]ny defendant alleged or held to be liable
in an action under § 106 or 107" may bring a contribution action. Id. Similar to
the Senate, the House Report agreed that the proposed language confirmed the
right of a person to be held jointly and severally liable. See id. The HouseJudiciary
Committee later made technical changes to the House Bill upon which the House-
Senate conference formulated the final language which adopted "during or follow-
ing." Id.
121. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 693-94 (claiming that contribution provision does
not create categories of liability).
122. See id. (citing Sun Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Inc., 124 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir.
1997)). For an explanation of the Sun Co. holding, see supra notes 46-49 and ac-
companying text. There, the court explained that § 113 incorporates the liability
scheme of § 107 and apportions all CERCLA-defined costs. See id.
123. See Aviall, 312 F.3d. at 694 (arguing regulatory scheme of contribution
provision hinges on those sections that preceded it, namely cost recovery action).
124. See id. at 690-91 (arguing against reliance on state remedies). Specifi-
cally, the court cited that as of 2000, six states had "contribution statutes limited to
contribution between judgment debtors," each with varying procedural rules. Id.
125. See id. at 692-93 (arguing for existing state law cause of action). The
dissent acknowledged that other circuit court decisions had held that federal con-
tribution rights preempt state law, but they did not believe those decisions con-
flicted with their interpretation. Id.
18
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CLA.126 The court consequently ignored the elementary canon of
statutory construction that an enacting sentence is never trumped
by a savings clause in the same provision. 127 In doing so, the major-
ity "nullifiied] the substantive portion of the section" to render one
part (the enabling clause) inoperative. 128
The practical effect of underscoring the savings clause was to
invalidate state law causes of action in site contamination cases,
namely in negligence, nuisance, abnormally dangerous activities or
trespass actions.' 29 This contravenes the general purpose of a sav-
ings clause which is to ensure that the statute in which it appears
will not preempt whatever other rights of action exist to rectify the
harm addressed in the legislation.130 As Aviall had two separate
state law contribution claims against Cooper under Texas statutes,
the provision should have saved those causes of action outside of
the federal courts.' 3 '
D. Inconsistent Case Law and Public Policy
The final critical flaw in the Fifth Circuit's holding was its insis-
tence that case precedent and public policy together supported Avi-
all's contention. 13 2 The reliance on case precedence is especially
troubling when one considers the issue here involved one of first
impression and that many district courts had reached differing con-
clusions on a PRP's ability to bring suit before a pending CERCLA
126. See id. at 692-93 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (1994)). Relevant provisions
of this CERCLA section state: "Nothing in this chapter shall affect or modify in
any way the obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal or State
law .. " Id.
127. See id. (showing court erred in statutory interpretation) (citing Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985)).
128. See Fershee, supra note 20, at 1754 (discussing difference between major-
ity opinion approach and district court). The district court reasoned that a "more
reasonable reading" was to preserve rather than negate state law claims. Id.
129. See Horton, supra note 4, at 231 (listing state law claims). To make a
negligence claim in most jurisdictions, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the de-
fendant did not meet a reasonable standard of care; In nuisance, the claim re-
quires proof the invasion was unreasonable; a common law action for abnormally
dangerous behavior requires the balancing of various factors; trespass requires a
showing the defendant acted intentionally. Id.
130. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 693 (arguing majority's opinion simply provides
example of when contribution claim might be brought). The dissent believed that
if any repugnancy existed between the two clauses, it was the savings clause that
should have been invalidated. Id.
131. See Brief for Cooper Indus., supra note 18, at 3 (claiming Aviall had avail-
able remedies). The state law contribution claims involved two Texas environmen-
tal statutes: the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act and the Texas Water Code. Id.
132. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 688, 690 (citing published cases supporting hold-
ing and policy reasons for decision).
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action. 133 Many other courts had simply refused to comment on
the issue when presented with a similar factual scenario.1 34 In light
of these facts, the court's insistence that there was a clear guidance
on section 113(f)(1)'s interpretation is unconvincing when no cir-
cuit decision confronted Aviall's argument. 35
Further, the court relied tremendously on public policy to bol-
ster its arguments that PRPs like Aviall require favorable contri-
bution privileges to further environmental goals.1 36 The court's
contention that a landowner would not effectuate a prompt
cleanup of their property and culpable PRPs would avoid paying
their share of cleanup costs without liberal contribution law
remains questionable. 137 In its decision, the court remained con-
vinced of these fears without any strong evidence that state reme-
dies could not mitigate these policy concerns effectively.1 38
The majority's argument, however, is internally inconsistent; if
policy is a deciding issue, the majority ignored that the central pol-
icy here is to enable persons liable for costs under section 106 or
107(a) to join or otherwise pursue other joint tortfeasors in an ac-
tion for contribution. 139 Maintaining the integrity of the spirit and
purpose of the statute's language meets that goal. 140 The court
failed to cite convincing evidence to support that their fear in
delayed clean-ups or the mis-allocation of costs to PRPs was a sub-
stantial threat or that the availability of a liberal contribution action
133. See id. at 695-96 (stating other appellate courts have addressed related
questions concerning the proper interpretation of § 113(f) (1), but none of them
have specifically addressed the issue of whether § 106 or § 107 action is prerequi-
site to § 113(f)(1) contribution action). The district court noted prior cases indi-
cating a § 106 or a § 107(a) action was not required for a § 113(f)(1) had
distinguishable fact patterns. See Fershee, supra note 20, at 1755. The district
court also dispensed with Fifth Circuit cases that allowed CERCLA contribution
suits where there had been only state agency enforcement because not one raised
the issue of whether a PRP could seek such contribution without a CERCLA action
against it. Id.
134. See Aviall, 312 F.3d at 695 n.13 (listing cases permitting § 113 actions but
not commenting on statute's language).
135. See id. (emphasizing lack of case precedent for subject matter of dis-
pute).
136. See id. at 689 (arguing for removal of substantial obstacles to facilitate
CERCLA's purposes). For an overview of the policy considerations the majority
cited, see supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
137. See id. at 690 (noting byproducts of dissent's narrow holding).
138. See id. (emphasizing lack of force for state remedies without reference to
evidence to indicate such effects).
139. See Brief for Cooper Indus., supra note 18, at 36 (citing Cooper's conten-
tion effectuates true policy of act). Nowhere in the act did Congress tie the enact-
ment of § 113(f) (1) to a policy favoring voluntarism. Id.
140. See id. (stating that codification of federal right of contribution was
aimed for parties to pursue jointfeasors).
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was critical to facilitating CERCLA's goals.141 Even in light of these
policy arguments, it is clear that such considerations should not be
substituted for the legislature's judgment when a provision's text
and structure is unambiguous as exhibited in section 113(f)(1).142
The ironic inconsistency of the court's policy argument is to
undermine section 113 altogether, most notably when the court
chooses to ignore the 113 (g) (3) limitations period and creates its
own "savings clause contribution claim" time period which Con-
gress did not mandate. 143 Based on the statutory text and the es-
sential purposes behind SARA and CERCILA, Cooper's contention
properly effectuates the fundamental policies behind section
113(f) (1), and their argument should have not been defeated.1 44
VI. IMPACT
The en banc court's conclusion that CERCLA authorizes re-
sponsible parties to bring federal suits when they please broadly un-
dermines CERCLA-based contribution suits and the foundation of
equitable contribution.1 45 The by-product of Aviall is that federal
courts faces a difficult dilemma; the courts may be compelled in
future cases to order a PRP to pay "contribution" to another PRP
when the joint liability they potentially owe to the federal or state
government under CERCLA is not discharged. 146 The unfortunate
result is that defendants could be subject to multiple liability since a
settlement in a voluntary cleanup scenario would not discharge the
141. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 15
(arguing majority's claim lacked evidence in record). In fact, even if the court's
assumption is correct, contribution under their terms still creates the prospect of
creating the bad policy of double liability, a circumstance when a previous land-
owner is liable both to the current PRP and then again to the government in a
separate action. Id. at 16.
142. See Avial 312 F.3d at 697 (arguing that as long as the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent, no need exists for court to inquire beyond plain language
of statute) (citing United States v. Ron PairEnters. Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989)).
143. See Brief for Cooper Indus., supra note 18, at 32 (arguing that if Congress
had intended to create such provision, it would have crafted limitations period to
match). Some courts have attempted to fill this void by creating a six-year limita-
tions period; however, opponents argue this is still clearly not the proscribed con-
tribution time period under § 113(g). Id. For the pertinent text of 113(g) (2), see
supra note 97.
144. See Brief for Cooper Indus., supra note 18, at 40 (noting Cooper's inter-
pretation neither conflicts with nor contravenes CERCLA's dual purposes).
145. For a discussion of the basic tenets of contribution in common law and
the argument that they have been undermined after the Aviall holding, see supra
notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
146. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 18
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defendant's fault with the government and potentially subject PRPs
to double liability. 147 This seriously undercuts CERCLA's goal to
equitably allocate cleanup costs among joint tortfeasors because the
policy facilitates inconsistent liability among existing PRPs. 148
Further, the court will now be responsible for applying CER-
CLA to state law claims.149 Due to the court's liberal interpretation
of 113(f) (1) and their choice of underscoring federal suits in the
savings clause, parties will choose to bypass weaker state remedies
and initiate a federal suit to effectuate their chance for recovery.1 50
It is very unlikely that Congress intended for CERCLA to expand so
dramatically the jurisdiction of federal courts in such cases that
should be best resolved in state forums.151
The Aviall holding has also created a discrepancy as to when a
113(f) (1) statute of limitations runs thus allowing more litigants
and more suits to occur than would have within a strict a three year
time period. 152 Consequently, the controversy behind 113(g)(2)
will certainly lead to a circuit split adding to the inconsistency as to
when voluntary cleanup acts are allowable. 153 The consequence of
this is an overall increase in the quantity of plaintiffs who may bring
147. See Brief for Cooper Indus., supra note 18, at 34 (arguing that expansive
reading of savings clause removes "contribution protection" that § 113(f) pro-
vides). A responsible party's voluntary cleanup does not discharge the underlying
liability to the government. Id. Thus, a party ordered to pay "contribution" under
Aviall has no assurance that its payment will discharge its liability and it can remain
subject to a future government cost recovery action. See id.
148. For a discussion of the purpose behind § 113(f) (1)'s passing, see supra
notes 52-54 and accompanying text. Some have suggested that Congress might
wish to create a remedy, apart from 113(f), for responsible parties who engage in
voluntary cleanup. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22,
at 18. Yet, this remains a policy decision that Congress should effectuate, not the
courts. Id.
149. See Brief for Cooper Indus., supra note 18, at 12, and accompanying text
(citing that savings clause creates non-exclusive causes of action rather than just
state suits); see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (noting weakness of state
remedies in favor of federal suits if savings clause augments federal claims).
151. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 19
(stating that CERCLA gives federal courts structures and limits). Even in the pre-
sent case, Aviall had state contract claims under the law of Texas that were ignored
in favor of the federal suit. See supra note 131. Some scholars have noted that
given the varying standards of common law, state court actions are often unpre-
dictable leading to unpredictable and inconsistent results. See Horton, supra note
4, at 231. However, the solution to this problem may lie in an amendment to § 113
rather than expanding the Federal court's jurisdiction. Id.
152. See supra notes 95-98; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Cu-
riae, supra note 22, at 31 (adding expansiveness in time limitation after Aviall is
beyond Congress' intentions).
153. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 19
(addressing that decision allows issue to "percolate" in lower courts).
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suit and as these land contamination case are complex and costly,
an increase in court time and expenditures is inevitable. 154 The
court effectively bypassed Congress by allowing some suits a three
year statute of limitations and those brought under the savings
clause a six year leniency, the latter of which allows ineligible PRPs
to seek relief.1 55
Perhaps understanding the immediacy of this problem, the Su-
preme Court of the United States granted Cooper's petition for writ
of certiorari on January 9, 2004.156 The issue of CERCLA's contribu-
tion provision is an issue best resolved sooner so that this controver-
sial debate and the host of other issues that stem from the Aviall
holding are resolved before serious problems accumulate in the
realm of environmental law. 157
Saleel V. Sabnis
154. See id. (noting adverse effects on court). Not only are there a substantial
number of potential plaintiffs who have a great incentive to bring such suits, but
the nature of these suits are inherently complex. See id. The land contamination
cases center around expert testimony based on a scientific inquiry about the condi-
tions at the site which involve a great expenditure in costs and court resources. Id.
155. See Brief for Cooper Indus., supra note 18, at 32 (stating such construc-
tion undermines statutory framework Congress created).
156. See id. at 2 (stating date of grant).
157. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 20
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